The global financial crisis: origin, contagion and impacts on Ethiopia by Paul, I
JBAS                                                                                                                  Vol.2 No.1 May. 2010 
 
1
rapid increase in precaution




The financial crisis that erupted in September 2008—following more than two 
years of financial turmoil has become global crisis for the world economy. An 
attempt is made in this study to assess the possible causes of the origin, 
contagion and impact of the current global financial crisis with particular 
emphasis on Africa and Ethiopia. It also provides a summarized historical 
overview of past global financial crises in view of the economic theories of 
financial crises.  The study utilizes the fundamental economic theories related 
to financial crisis to depict and illustrate the bigger picture. The paramount 
importance of this study is a detailed analysis of the current global financial 
crisis, and its wide ranging impacts by creating a clear link with past financial 
crises in different regions of the world. The method followed throughout this 
paper is qualitative and descriptive in nature. The transmission channels 
for the Ethiopian economy in the study are the knock on effects, external 
sector and commodity prices, investment, official transfers and remittance 
and the impact on the flower industry.  
Keywords: Global Financial Crisis, recession, Investment, Ethiopia. 
Background 
 
The financial crisis that erupted in September 2008—following more than 
two years of financial turmoil—has become global crisis for the world 
economy. Economic activity in high-income and developing countries alike 
fell abruptly in the final quarter of 2008. The fallout is unemployment on the 
rise, and poverty set to increase in developing economies, bringing with it a 
substantial deterioration in conditions for the worlds poor and most 
vulnerable. The outbreak of the financial crisis provoked broad liquidation of 
investments, substantial loss in wealth worldwide, a tightening of lending 
conditions, and a widespread increase in uncertainty. Higher borrowing costs 
and tighter credit conditions, coupled with the increase in uncertainty 
provoked a global flight on quality, caused firms to cut back on investment 
expenditures, and households to delay purchases of big-ticket items. This 









investment, production, trade, and gross domestic product (GDP). The 
sharpest declines in economic activity were concentrated among countries 
specialized in the production of durable and investment goods and in 
countries with serious existing macroeconomic vulnerabilities. The drop in 
economic activity, combined with much weaker capital flows to developing 
countries, is placing a large number of low- and middle-income countries 
under serious financial strain. Greater integration of the global economy and 
the increasing importance of private actors in international finance over the 
past three decades have brought enormous benefits to developing countries, 
but they also have widened  the scope for economic turmoil. What began as a 
bursting of the U.S. housing market bubble and a rise in foreclosures has 
ballooned into a global financial crisis. Some of the largest and most 
venerable banks, investment houses, and insurance companies have either 
declared bankruptcy or have had to be rescued financially. In October 2008, 
credit flows froze, lender confidence dropped, and one after another the 
economies of countries around the world dipped toward recession. The crisis 
exposed fundamental weaknesses in financial systems worldwide, and 
despite coordinated easing of monetary policy by governments and trillions 
of dollars in intervention by governments and the International Monetary 




The current global financial crisis has shaken the world economy by causing 
a global turmoil. The crisis, which started as a housing bubble in the U.S got 
rapidly transmitted to Europe forcing different financial institutions 
(including banks, insurance companies, and security investors) and giant 
multinational companies to bankruptcy. Due to foreclosures people became 
homeless and were laid off from their jobs due to the crisis. Many financial 
institutions in the west have gone into total bankruptcy with valueless paper 
based assets. Many have rescheduled their investment plans, canceled 
ongoing projects and laid off huge number of work force. Least developed 
countries of the world, including those in Africa, are also being affected by 
the decline in the demand of their exports and a decrease in private and 
public transfers.  The impact of the crisis on the Ethiopian economy has 
remained controversial with contradicting comments from different experts 
and state officials. Hence, this paper will try to address this gap by 
undertaking a detailed analysis of the impact of the crisis on the Ethiopian 
economy.  
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Objectives of the study  
[ 
The objectives of the study are:- 
1. To assess the possible causes of the origin, contagion and impact of 
the current global financial crisis with particular emphasis on Africa 
and Ethiopia.  
2. To provide a summarized historical overview of past global financial 
crises in relation to the economic theories of financial crises.  
3. To analyze the economic theories related to financial crisis to depict 
and illustrate the bigger picture. 
4. To suggest policy adjustments which need to be implemented to 
avoid further worsening of the economic condition of the country. 
 
Scope of the study 
 
The study begins with a brief historical description of financial crises from 
the Great Depression of 1930s, followed by the Latin American debt crisis of 
1980s, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98. It systematically analyses 
the causes, transmission mechanisms and wide ranging impacts of the 
current global financial crisis in developed and developing countries 




The study has relied completely on secondary data sources. The sources 
of data are mainly from different international financial institutions like 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, African Development Bank, 
and also Ethiopian government institutions like National Bank of 
Ethiopia, Investment Bureau, Ethiopian Customs Authority, and Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). The method followed 
throughout this paper is qualitative and descriptive in nature. The period 
of the study starts from September 2008 after which the current global 
financial crisis has erupted. The transmission channels of the financial 





external sector and commodity prices, investment, official transfers and 
remittance and the impact on the flower industry. 
 
Organization of the study 
 
The organization of the study is as follows: this section is introductory in 
nature and provides the problem, objectives, significance, and scope of the 
study. The next section provides a background of the global financial crisis 
by bringing up historical records, describing economic theories on financial 
crisis and summarizing the impact of past financial crises. The third section 
focuses fully on the current global financial crisis by drawing facts on the 
origin, contagion and effects of the crisis with specific emphasis on 
Ethiopian economy. The last section indicates policy adjustments that need 
to be implemented to avoid further worsening of the economic condition of 
the country. 
Review of related literature 
Historical background 
 
A salient feature in the history of the global economic activities has been the 
alternative occurrence of prosperity and depression. The period of prosperity 
is manifested in terms of increment in productive capacity, business 
alternatives, entrepreneurship, innovation, and profit, while the panic of a 
failing economy could start from any one of the sectors, like housing or 
banking, and finally result in an economy wide concern. However, as 
indicated in the scope of the study, the discussions will be based on financial 
crises which have left remarkable effects on the global economy: the Great 
Depression of 1930s, the Latin American debt crisis of 1980s, the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997/98 and the current global economic crisis (2008/09). 
[  
The Great Depression 
  
The Great Depression is one of the catastrophic economic downturns 
witnessed in recent history with a wide reaching effect in North America, 
Europe, and other industrialized nations of the world with a duration of ten 
years (1929-1939). The depression started with a collapse of stock market of 
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the New York Stock Exchange in 1929. The decline of the stock exchange 
was followed by a precipitous decline in asset value decreasing the credit 
portfolio of banks. Surprisingly, 11,000 of the 25,000 banks in USA have 
stumbled to bankruptcy by 1933. Related to this, a decrease in consumer 
spending and demand, and hence productivity has aggravated the downward 
spiral of the global economy. Even though the crisis did start in United States 
of America, it did not take long for it to be transmitted to Europe and other 
industrialized nations as there was an intimate affiliation forged between 
USA and those economies as a result of World War I (Bordo, 2000).The 
downturn was so severe that it resulted in a 50% decrease in industrial output 
in USA, a 33% lay-off rate in Germany, and a 25% decline in exports of 
Great Britain. Further East, the Depression was extended to the Japanese 
manufacturing output, which was significantly affected. What has made the 
impacts of the depression prolonged were the improper protective policy 
measures taken by individual countries including imposing tariffs, and 
setting quotas on foreign imports (Kindleberger, 1986).  
 
The Latin American debt crisis 
 
The Latin American debt crisis that happened in 1980s was the result of 
Latin American countries failure to repay the international debts.  
Fundamentally, the period was an era of economic opening up for Latin 
American countries notably Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico investing hugely 
on infrastructure and heavy industries.  Latin American Countries were 
having a debt of US $ 315 billion in 1983 with a cumulative annual growth 
rate of 20.4%, approximately 50% of the region’s GDP, while debt service 
was around US $66 billion. The increase in interest rate in USA and Europe 
as a buffer from increased oil price has made it hard for indebted Latin 
American Countries to pay their debts back. This crisis has caused a massive 
capital outflow from these countries decreasing the real GDP growth rate of 
the region by 2.3% and per capita income by around 9%. 
 
Asian financial crisis 
 
The Asian financial crisis was one of the giant crises of recent history that 
gripped much of Asia beginning in 1997 with widespread offsite panic. The 
center of crisis was Southeast Asia, where Indonesia, South Korea, and 
Thailand constituting the worst hit nations, while Hong Kong, Malaysia, 





and Vietnam taking their fair share of the hustle. The crisis has been 
attributed to distorted incentives within lender-borrower relationship of 
Asian economies. This has availed a large quantity of credit in a highly-
leveraged economic climate pushing up the asset price to unsustainable level. 
As the artificially swelled asset price start to collapse, individuals and 
companies started to default on their creditors. The disequilibrium in the 
lender-borrower relationship has caused a panic to lenders urging them to 
withdraw deposits from the countries causing credit crunch and further 
bankruptcies. A further capital flight has also put in place a depreciative 
pressure on the exchange rates of these economies forcing them to increase 
domestic currency rate, and buy up any excess domestic currency at a fixed 
exchange rate with foreign reserves to safeguard their currency value. Yet 
any of the policy responses could not result in significant change in the tide 
of fleeing capital, growing foreign-currency-denominated-liabilities, and 
deepening crisis.  
The historical lessons learnt from these regional crises are outflow of capital, 
exchange rate instability, credit crunch and bankruptcies. Similar experiences 
are seen in the present global financial crisis which erupted in September 
2008. 
Economic theories of financial crises 
In most of the historic crises, two or more of the above mentioned causative 
factors were operating parallel making it challenging to model crises. Hence, 
it remains a difficult task to have a representative model. Of the economic 
models explaining financial crises, Minsky’s (1996) theory is the popular 
one which proposes an explanation to financial crises in a closed economy 
which argues that financial fragility is a typical feature of capitalist economy 
where firms choose among hedge finance, speculative finance, and ponzi 
finance. For hedge finance, income flows are expected to meet financial 
obligations in every period, including both the principal and the interest on 
loans. For speculative finance, a firm must roll over debt because income 
flows are expected to only cover interest costs. None of the principal is paid 
off. For ponzi finance, expected income flows will not even cover interest 
cost, so the firm must borrow more or sell off assets simply to service its 
debt. The hope is that either the market value of assets or income will rise 
enough to pay off interest and principal.  According to Minsky (ibid)  
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financial fragility go along with business cycle embracing a coupling of 
hedge finance with recessionary firm, speculative finance with expansionary 
firm and ponzi finance with illusionary firm. According to the theory, ponzi 
financing is the most fragile type of financing structure, which might grow to 
economy wide crisis through contagion.  
 











The business cycle of firms is an oscillatory phasing where they swing from 
recessionary trend to expansionary trend and to illusionary trend. Provided 
that the cycle is managed in such a way that it would not result in 
bankruptcy, it is healthy to go through the three steps. A firm that is in 
recessionary stage will get additional financing only as hedge finance. As the 
productivity of the firm gets well, then it could be possible to get speculative 
financing by predicting about profits. Nevertheless, the increase in 
speculative finance that a firm gets obliged to could make its liability grow 
bigger than its asset base. At this stage of ponzi financing, the way to get 
loan from banks will be only through convincing the banks that it is still a 
viable firm that do have a hope to withstand financial tides. Provided that 
this situation of a firm in ponzi financing gets worse, it would be inevitable 
for the firm to stumble to bankruptcy. 
 
Other less widely adopted models of financial crises are the Coordination 
Theory and the Herd Behavior Theory. In the coordination theory, the 
fundamental economic factor behind most economic crises is supposed to be 
consumer feedback. As far as the feedback of consumers stays positive 





invest. On the other hand a decline in positivism of consumer feedback will 
alert investors to withhold investment leading to potential crisis (Krugman, 
1979). The other model, the herd behavior model, fostered by economists 
like Banerjee (1992) assumes crises as results of the mimicking nature of 
financial investors in decision making, which would overvalue asset prices in 
an artificial way. Provided that the adaptive learning of investors would 
make them decide according to what others do, a slight decline in asset price 
could lead to a total collapse. 
Emergence and impacts of the current global financial crisis                  
on Africa and Ethiopia 
Origin and contagion of global financial crisis  
Each financial crisis is unique, yet each bears some resemblance to others. In 
general, crises have been generated by factors such as an over shooting of 
markets, excessive leveraging of debt, credit booms, miscalculation of risks, 
rapid out flow of capital from a country, mismatches between asset types, 
unsustainable macroeconomic policies, off-balance sheet operations by 
banks, lack of experience with new financial instruments, and deregulation 
without sufficient market monitoring and oversight (CRS, 2008). The current 
global financial crisis started to show its effects in the middle of 2007/08 
fiscal year. It started in the U.S. and European investment banks, insurance 
firms and mortgage banks as a result of their failure to apply stringent risk 
controls for bad debts, collateralize debt insurance and overlooking potential 
frauds. As shown in Figure 2 the   current crisis harkens back to the 1997-98 
Asian financial crisis in which Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea had to 
borrow from IMF to service their short-term foreign debt and to cope with a 
dramatic drop in the values of their currency and deteriorating financial 
condition. Determined not to be caught with insufficient foreign exchange 
reserves, countries subsequently began to accumulate dollars, Euros, pounds, 
and yen in record amounts. This was facilitated by the U.S. trade (current 
account) deficit. 
 
By mid-2008, world currency reserves by governments had reached $ 4.4 
trillion with China’s reserves alone approaching $ 2 trillion, Japan’s nearly $ 
1 trillion, Russia’s more than $ 500 billion, and India, South Korea, and  
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the holders of CDOs purcha
                                                        
Brazil each with more than $ 200 billion. The accumulation of hard currency 
assets was so great in some countries that they diverted some of their 
reserves into sovereign wealth funds that were to invest in higher yielding 
assets than the U.S. Treasury and other government securities. 
Following the Asian financial crisis, much of the world’s “hot money” began 
to flow into high technology stocks. The so-called “dot-com boom” ended in 
the spring of 2000 as the value of equities in many high-technology 
companies collapsed. After the dot-com bust, more “hot investment capital” 
began to flow into housing markets — not only in the United States but in 
other countries of the world. At the same time, China and other countries 
invested much of their accumulations of foreign exchange into U.S. Treasury 
and other securities. While this helped to keep U.S. interest rates low, it also 
tended to keep mortgage interest rates at lower and attractive levels for 
prospective home buyers. 
 
This housing boom coincided with greater popularity of the securitization of 
assets, particularly mortgage debt (including sub prime mortgages), into 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). A problem was that the mortgage 
originators often were mortgage finance companies whose main purpose was 
to write mortgages using funds provided by banks and other financial 
institutions or borrowed. They were paid for each mortgage originated but 
had no responsibility for loans gone bad. Of course, the incentive for them 
was to maximize the number of loans concluded. This coincided with 
political pressures to enable more Americans to buy homes, although it 
appears that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac2 were not directly complicit in the 
loosening of lending standards and the rise of sub prime mortgages. In order 
to cover the risk of defaults on mortgages, particularly sub prime mortgages, 
sed credit default swaps3 (CDSs). These are 
      
2 Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) is a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) chartered by 
Congress in 1968 as a private shareholder-owned company with a mission to provide liquidity and stability to the 
U.S. housing and mortgage markets. It operates in the U.S. secondary mortgage market and funds its mortgage 
investments primarily by issuing debt securities in the domestic and international capital markets. Freddie Mac 
(Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp) is a stockholder-owned GSE chartered by Congress in 1970 as a competitor 
to Fannie Mae. It also operates in the secondary mortgage market. It purchases, guarantees, and securitizes 
mortgages to form mortgage-backed securities. For an analysis of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s role in the 
bprime crisis, see David Goldstein and Kevin G. Hall, “Private sector loans, not Fannie or Freddie, triggered 
isis,” McClatchy Newspapers, October 12, 2008. 
su
cr
3 A credit default swap is a credit derivative contract in which one party (protection buyer) pays a periodic fee to 
another party (protection seller) in return for compensation for default (or similar credit event) by a reference entity. 
The reference entity is not a party to the credit default swap. It is not necessary for the protection buyer to suffer an 
actual loss to be eligible for compensation if a credit event occurs. The protection buyer gives up the risk of default 
by the reference entity, and takes on the risk of simultaneous default by both the protection seller and the reference 







types of insurance contract (a financial derivative) that lenders purchase 
against the possibility of credit event (a default on a debt obligation, 
bankruptcy, restructuring, or credit rating downgrade) associated with debt, a 
borrowing institution, or other referenced entity. The purchaser of the CDS 
does not have to have a financial interest in the referenced entity, so CDSs 
quickly became more of a speculative asset than an insurance policy. As long 
as the credit events (defaults) never occurred, insurers of CDSs could earn 
huge amounts in fees relative to their capital base (since these were 
technically not insurance, they did not fall under insurance regulations 
requiring sufficient capital to pay claims, although credit derivatives 
requiring collateral became more and more common in recent years). The 
sellers of the CDSs that protected against defaults often covered their risk by 
turning around and buying CDSs that paid in case of default. 
 
As the risk of defaults rose, the cost of the CDS protection rose. Investors, 
therefore, could arbitrage between the lower and higher risk CDSs and 
generate large income streams with what was perceived to be minimal risk. 
In 2007, the notional value (face value of underlying assets) of credit default 
swaps had reached $ 62 trillion, more than the combined gross domestic 
product of the entire world ($ 54 trillion), although the actual amount at risk 
was only a fraction of that amount. By July 2008, the notional value of CDSs 
had declined to $ 54.6 trillion and by October 2008 to an estimated $ 46.95 
trillion. The system of CDSs generated large profits for the companies 
involved until the default rate, particularly on sub prime mortgages, and the 
number of bankruptcies began to rise. Soon the leverage that generated 
outsized profits began to generate outsized losses, and in October 2008, the 














eference entity. See CRS Report RS22932, Credit Default Swaps: Frequently Asked Questions, by Edward V. 
urphy. 
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Generally, the current global financial meltdown demonstrates the 
increasing inter-connectedness of the world by affecting the livelihoods of 
almost everyone. This crisis also brought an important point that U.S. is still 
the center of the financial world. As indicated in CRS (2008), U.S. is the 
major guarantor of the international financial system, the provider of dollar, 
which is a widely used currency reserve and international medium of 
exchange, and a contributor to much of the financial capital that sloshes 
around the world, any shake off in the U.S. financial system would take a 
global hue.  
Impacts of the crisis on African countries 
 
A preliminary estimate of the impact of the global economic crisis in Africa 
is very minimal as compared to other regions. The African Development 
Bank Report (2009) attributes this to Africa’s low share of total capital 
flows, the limited number of countries leveraging funds on international 
markets and the limited correlation between Africa and industrialized 
countries’ financial markets. However, the global crisis is gradually showing 
its effects on the fragile economy of the African continent. These countries, 
especially the Sub-Sahara African countries, are to a large extent dependent 
on the economies of the developed countries with regard to aid and other 
forms of development assistance 
 
The African Development Bank has outlined four major risks for African 
Countries that are faced with the financial crisis and the global recession. 
These risks are the capital out flow risk, fiscal risk, export risk and the 
liquidity risk. With regard to the capital outflow risk, as a result of the 
decline in the private capital flows and investment, the resulting impact will 
prevail on the exchange rate and the ability to finance the current account 
deficit. A decline in revenue as a result of low demand for products coupled 
with the increase in expenditure will exacerbate the fiscal risk in these 
countries. The slow demand for primary products will leave the export of 
these countries unprotected while the weakening of the global financial 
market plays its own role in affecting the banking sector and the government. 
The fiscal balance and current account balance as percentage of the total 
GDP is shown in the following table. 
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Table 1: Overall fiscal balance and current account balance (% GDP), 
2007-2009 
Fiscal Balance Current Account No.  
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 
1 Africa 1.89 1.82 -5.06 2.66 2.72 -4.05 
1.1 North Africa 
(including Sudan) 
2.90 2.38 -5.79 10.65 10.14 1.75 
1.2 Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
1.25 1.48 -4.61 -2.37 -1.68 -7.70 
2 By Region 
2.1 Central Africa 5.46 10.7
3 
3.26 -1.47 3.88 -9.39 
2.2 Northern Africa 3.51 2.98 -6.15 13.05 12.15 3.02 
2.3 Southern Africa 2.47 2.32 -3.46 -3.34 -3.01 -7.65 
2.4 Western Africa -0.54 -0.08 -9.00 0.11 0.72 -8.57 
    Source: African Development Bank, February 2009 
Demand for the primary products, which most of the African countries are 
exporting is gradually slowing down. For example, mining companies in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo are forced to scale back, postpone or 
abandon their investment plan due to the decline in the demand for these 
products.  
 
Impact of global economic slowdown on Ethiopian economy 
 
We have seen how the current global economic crisis has affected many 
European and African countries. In the Ethiopian case, the impact would not 
be significant on the financial sector since it is not completely integrated 
with the global financial system. In Ethiopia’s financial sector, mortgage 
borrowing is not a particularly significant activity of the national economy, is 
not directly affected by any “Sub-Prime Mortgage” crisis. However, it would 
be naïve to say that Ethiopia’s economy will not be affected by the credit 





in Ethiopia comes from those countries that are now in despair. The money 
flowing into the country; be it through international aid or remittance etc, is 
all subject to this global phenomenon. The effects of the crisis were being 
felt by the Ethiopian economy from October 2008 onwards; therefore the 
analysis is based on the years 2007/2008 and 2009.  
Knock on effects of the global credit crunch  
The country’s 2008-2009 budget shows that about 33% will be availed from 
bilateral aid, direct budget assistance and loans. Out of the approved 4.5 
billion dollars budget, 1.5 billion dollar is expected to be covered by loan, 
aid and direct budget subsidies. Hence, no doubt that global recession will 
have a knock-on effect on Ethiopia’s economy. For donor countries to honor 
their pledges would be unrealistic when they are faced with domestic 
economic instabilities. The particular projects related to ambitious 
“Millennium Development Goals”, such as eradicating extreme poverty and 
hunger; achieving universal primarily education; promoting gender equality 
and empowering woman; reducing child mortality; improving mental health; 
combating HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensuring 
environmental sustainability and developing a global partnership for 
development will not be honored fully.  Western countries will try to impose 
many restrictions so that they can withhold their money for their own use. 
The short term effects of the above measures of donors will result in the 
declining reserve of foreign currency with the National Bank. 
Impact on external sector performance and commodity prices 
Ethiopia’s economy is heavily dependent on export of primary commodities. 
The predominant dependence on agricultural activities has caused the 
country’s vulnerability to price shocks around the world. The major 
commodities that the country exports are coffee, oilseeds, leather products, 
pulses, meat products, chat and flower. During the first quarter of 2008/09, 
the balance of payments registered a deficit of USD 142.2 million, which 
was slightly less than the USD 155.6 million deficits registered in the 
preceding quarter. External sector performance of quarter II (2008/09) shows 
that export receipts reached USD 270.9 million, 1.2 percent higher than that 
of last year same quarter. Quarter II of 2008/09 is feeling the greatest hit of 
the crisis. When compared with quarter I of the same fiscal year, there is a 
22.8 percent decline in total exports. Together with the decline in exports, 
the country’s trade balance is showing negative figures in quarter II (1766.9) 
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Table 2  Value of major export items  
Source: Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority, 2008 
2007/08 
(In Millions of 
USD) 
2008/09 
(In Millions of USD 










share C/B C/A 
Coffee 52.6 19.6 133.3 37.9 41.7 15.4 -68.7 -20.6 
Oilseeds 31.4 11.7 45.1 12.8 51.7 19.1 14.7 64.4 
Leather and Leather 
products 29.1 10.9 25.3 7.2 28.5 10.5 12.6 -2.1 
Pulses 31.1 11.6 21.5 6.1 22.5 8.3 4.7 -27.7 
Meat & Meat 
Products 5.6 2.1 8.5 2.4 7.1 2.6 -16.7 27.5 
Fruits & Vegetables 2.9 1.1 4.7 1.3 2.9 1.1 -37.8 2.7 
Live Animals 16.1 6.0 15.7 4.5 16.8 6.2 7.2 4.5 
Chat 28.8 10.7 32.9 9.4 34.4 12.7 4.4 19.6 
Gold 15.9 5.9 17.5 5.0 20.3 7.5 16.0 27.9 
Flower 24.0 9.0 26.8 7.6 28.8 10.6 7.6 20.3 
Others 30.4 11.4 20.3 5.8 16.2 6.0 -20.4 -46.8 
Total 267.7 100.0 351.7 100.0 270.9 100.0 -23.0 1.2 
 
The effect of the crisis is still seen on the Ethiopian imports, where there is a 
10.3percent decline in quarter II from quarter I of the same fiscal year. This 
does not mean that the decline in imports is harming the economy, but the 
cause of the decline is shortage of foreign currency reserve in the national 
bank, again caused by the global economic slow down. There is a significant 
decline in the value of export of coffee (being the major export commodity 
of the country). In Quarter I of 2008-09, coffee registered an export value of 
USD 133.3 million  while it declined to USD 41.7  million in Quarter II of 
the same fiscal year (68.7 % decline).. It is a well known fact that the decline 
in coffee exports shakes the whole economy since 20 – 25 percent of the 
total exports of the country are dependent on this crop. Total revenue derived 
from the export sector has declined from USD 351.7 million in Quarter I to 
USD 270.9 million in quarter II. The above ups and downs are clear 
indications of the evil effects of the global economic crisis (Ethiopian 






Effect of the crisis on the country’s flower industry 
 
If we compare the growth rates between quarter II of 2007-08 and 2008-09, 
there is a significant decline in exports of flowers (20.3 percent to 7.6 
percent). If we compare Quarter I and II of 2008/2009 with regards to flower 
export, there is very little increase in its value as shown in Table 1 
 
Official transfers and remittance 
 
The other source of Ethiopian foreign exchange is remittance from 
Ethiopians living abroad. The remittance from Ethiopians living abroad 
reached $1 billion in 2007-08. Recession and loss of jobs in the West could 
affect Ethiopians in Diaspora and reduce the money flowing into the country. 
For instance, individual transfers have declined from USD 503,455 million 
in quarter one to USD 485,297 million, registering a 3.6 percent decline. It is 
not possible to accurately predict the impact of global recession on Diaspora 
remittance, but even 30% reduction in remittance would mean a $300 million 
loss to the economy, which is equivalent to the lose of foreign exchange 
income from coffee export.  
The aid that Ethiopia receives is predominantly dependent on funds coming 
from countries and multi-national companies which are heavily affected by 
the current economic downturn. The official transfers have increased from 
USD 281,256 million to USD 513,228 million in the 2008/2009 first and 
second quarters. This is due to the fact that the IMF gave budgetary 
assistance to all developing countries to withstand the current financial crisis. 
On the “Net Transfers”   there is a 32.2 percent increase in transfers, mainly 
resulting from assistance given by the IMF (National Bank of Ethiopia 
2009). 
Investment 
As expected, the global crisis has affected Ethiopia’s investment 
environment. In March 2008, the number of projects that were approved was 
2100, while only 1966 were approved in December of the same year. The 
size of the capital investment was 61333.2 million USD in June 2008 while it 
declined to only 28,510.3 million in December 2008. With regards to the 
potential employment creation of both permanent and temporary workers, 
the same decline was registered, running from 672489 workers in June 2008 
to 240960 in December 2008 (National bank of Ethiopia, 2009). 
JBAS                                                                                                                  Vol.2 No.1 May. 2010 
 
17
Table 3 Investment Indicators 
Indicators Jan 08 Mar 08 June 08 Sept 08 Dec 08 
Projects approved ‐ 2100 3256 2951 1966 
Capital investment size 
(in million Birr) 
‐ 45,026.9 61333.2 31,497.3 28,510.3 
Potential Employment 
Creation (Permanent and 
Temporary) 
‐ 362912 672489 391994 240960 
Source (National Bank of Ethiopia, 2009) 
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
Ethiopia was unable to reap the benefits of international price fall because of 
the serious foreign exchange shortage. Foreign reserve crisis coupled with 
high inflation rate is now crippling the country. Foreign direct investment is 
also likely to decline significantly although it is too early to show its overall 
impact on the economy. On the other hand, because donor countries are in 
deep recession themselves, the external grant and loan assistance would 
decline. From the discussion on the effect of the global crisis on Ethiopia, the 
following policy adjustments need to be implemented to avoid further 
worsening of the economic condition in the country. 
1. Export diversification: Being an underdeveloped economy that 
heavily depends on agriculture, the structure of Ethiopian export is 
dominated by agricultural products. The share of primary products in 
the export sector is significant, and should be diversified to other 
industrial activities. The diversification will help the country to 
withstand external shocks that would arise on any particular 
commodity. 
2. Strengthening the Ethiopian commodity exchange (ECX): The 
government of Ethiopia has to establish a reliable network through 
which export items are delivered to the international market. Recent 
developments like the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) are 
positive moves towards achieving a transparent and efficient 
transaction for the collection and delivery of agricultural products.  
3. Strengthening the foreign currency base: Depleted foreign 
reserves lead to shortage in available funds for imports. Importable 





medicines, which are essential to the smooth functioning of the 
overall economy.  
 
4. Encouraging the Ethiopian Diaspora to send remittance through 
formal banking transactions: The Ethiopian Diaspora living abroad 
can be considered as important source of foreign currency and 
income for the country. Therefore, policies have to be formulated 
towards greater efficiency that encourages the Diaspora to send 
money through formal bank channels. 
5. Strengthening local capacity to minimize dependence on foreign 
assistance: External shocks have huge impacts on countries that 
depend heavily on international assistance. Ethiopia, being one of 
them, needs to minimize its reliance on aid. Self sufficiency in terms 
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ANNEXURE -1: Balance of Payments 
Ethiopian Fiscal Year 2007/08 (millions of USD) 
2008/09 (millions 
of USD) Percentage Change 
Particulars 
 









Trade Balance -1142.7 -1312.6 -1592.4 -1921.7 -1766.9 -8.1 34.6 
       Exports 265.9 267.7 457.9 351.1 270.9 -22.8 1.2 
       Imports 
 
1408.6 1580.3 2050.2 2272.8 2037.9 -10.3 29.0 
Net Services 20.3 70.7 9.6 149.6 169.0 13.0 139.1 
 Travel 
5.1 
34.6 67.3 62.0 46.6 -24.8 34.8 
 Transportation 
62.7 
42.2 2.4 70.1 83.4 19.0 97.7 
  Government (n.i.e.) 
37.2 
29.2 47.6 24.8 54.2 118.7 85.7 
  Investment income 
10.9 
11.2 4.2 3.2 -5.4 -268.8 -148.2 
     Interest 
14.6 
16.4 7.1 7.3 -1.5 -120.4 -109.1 
       Cash (net)                   
14.7 
16.4 7.1 7.3 -1.5 -120.4 -109.1 
       Arrears 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 
     Dividend                      
-3.7 
-5.2 -2.9 -4.1 -3.9 -4.5 -24.7 
  Other Services 
 
-97.6 -46.5 -111.9 -10.5 -9.8 -6.2 -78.8 
Private Transfers 
 
596.4 578.3 654.2 688.2 798.6 16.0 38.1 
Current Account 
Balance 
(excl. public transfers) 
 
-526.0 
-663.5 -928.6 -1083.9 -799.3 -26.3 20.5 
Public Transfers* 
 
138.6 358.5 483.7 281.3 513.2 82.5 43.2 
Current Account 
Balance 










172.1 331.6 357.9 372.6 416.3 11.7 25.5 
  Long-term (net) 
72.5 
100.7 98.4 107.6 179.7 67.1 78.4 
     Disbursements 
78.8 
115.9 109.8 114.5 188.8 64.9 62.9 
     Repayments 6.3 15.2 11.4 6.9 9.1 31.1 -40.1 
         Cash 6.3 15.2 11.4 6.9 9.1 31.1 -40.1 
         Arrears 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 
 Direct Investment (net) 162.7 192.1 282.9 264.9 226.8 -14.4 18.1 
  Short-term (net) 
-63.2 
38.8 -23.4 0.1 9.8 6864.3 -74.8 
Net Errors & 
Omissions 
428.8 
-167.1 -68.6 287.8 -174.1 -160.5 4.2 
Overall Balance 
207.5 
-140.5 -155.6 -142.2 -43.9 -69.1 -68.8 
Financing -207.5 140.5 155.6 142.2 43.9 -69.1 -68.8 
  Reserves (-:increase) -207.5 140.5 155.6 142.2 43.9 -69.1 -68.8 
  NBE net foreign asset -282.3 50.7 146.1 104.8 -103.0 -198.3 -303.1 
   CBs net foreign asset 74.7 89.8 9.5 37.5 146.9 292.0 63.6 
Source:  Adopted from National Bank of Ethiopia’s report, 2008/2009 
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